FLK1 · Tort

Negligence — causation & remoteness

SQE1 revision notes — the key rules, leading cases and common traps for this topic, in plain English and current to 2026.

TOR.03 — Negligence: Causation & Remoteness

Once duty and breach are established, the claimant must prove the breach caused the damage and that the damage is not too remote. Both are required.

Factual causation — the "but for" test

Ask: but for the defendant's breach, would the harm have occurred? If it would have happened anyway, causation fails.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington HMC — negligent A&E doctor not liable; the patient would have died of arsenic poisoning regardless.

Multiple/uncertain causes — the exceptions

Material contribution: where medical science cannot establish "but for", but the negligent cause made a more than negligible contribution to an indivisible injury produced by cumulative causes, the claimant succeeds (Bailey v MoD [2008] EWCA Civ 883 [46]; Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw, cumulative dust). It does not apply where the injury would probably have happened anyway (Bailey [46]), or where there are only alternative possible causes (Wilsher).
Material increase in risk (McGhee v NCB, adopted in Fairchild v Glenhaven): a narrow exception, applied to mesothelioma and extended to asbestos lung cancer (Heneghan), where every exposure was to the same agent and science cannot say which exposure caused the disease. Outside mesothelioma, liability under this exception is proportionate to the defendant's share of the risk (Barker v Corus). For mesothelioma, Compensation Act 2006 s.3 makes each responsible person liable for the whole, jointly and severally.
Loss of a chance generally fails in clinical negligence — Gregg v Scott (his chance of a cure, ten-year disease-free survival, fell from 42% to 25%; because it was already below 50% before the negligence he could not prove the delay caused the outcome, and the House refused damages for the lost chance itself).

Legal causation — breaking the chain (novus actus interveniens)

A new intervening act can break the chain:

Third-party act — breaks the chain where, weighing its independence of the defendant, whether it was deliberate or wholly unreasonable, its foreseeability and whether the defendant was responsible for guarding against it, the original wrong becomes merely part of the history and it would be unfair to hold the defendant liable (Corr [15]; Jenkinson [40]).
Claimant's own conduct — if highly unreasonable — McKew v Holland (vs reasonable response in Wieland v Cyril Lord).
Act of nature — if unforeseeable.

Remoteness — reasonable foreseeability of type of damage

The Wagon Mound (No 1) replaced the old direct-consequence test (Re Polemis): damage must be of a reasonably foreseeable type.
Extent/manner need not be foreseeable — Hughes v Lord Advocate (type foreseeable, extent need not be); Bradford v Robinson Rentals.
Thin/eggshell skull rule: take the victim as you find them — Smith v Leech Brain. Foreseeability of type of injury is enough; its severity (due to the claimant's vulnerability) is irrelevant.

Common SBAQ traps

Don't confuse the two stages — factual causation ("but for") is separate from remoteness (foreseeable type).
The exceptions (material contribution / increased risk) are narrow — default is "but for".
Type vs extent: the type of harm must be foreseeable; the precise way it happened and its scale need not be.
Eggshell skull applies to physical and psychiatric harm, not just "egg shell personalities" — and it presupposes some foreseeable injury first.
Foreseeability alone does not decide novus actus: a foreseeable intervention can still break the chain (Lamb v Camden; Simmons v British Steel [2004] UKHL 20 67, adopted in Corr v IBC [2008] UKHL 13), unless it was the very act the defendant's duty was to guard against (Reeves). Negligent treatment of the injury the defendant caused usually does not break it (Webb v Barclays Bank [2001] EWCA Civ 1141). Treatment so grossly negligent as to be a completely inappropriate response to that injury can (Webb [55]); gross negligence is not a strict legal requirement, the test is multi-factorial (Jenkinson v Hertfordshire CC [2023] EWHC 872 (KB) [43], [49]).

Try a real SQE1 question

This question is taken from the bank. Answer it to see the worked reasoning and the tutor. You do not need to sign up to try it.

A man is a front-seat passenger in a car driven by a friend. The friend drives negligently and collides with another vehicle. The man was not wearing his seatbelt. Medical evidence establishes that had he worn the seatbelt his injuries would have been substantially less severe, though he would still have suffered some injury from the impact. The man sues his friend in negligence. Liability for the collision is admitted. The defendant argues that the man's damages should be reduced because of his failure to wear a seatbelt.

Practise at the real standard

Strong on this topic? SQE1 tests 137 of them, and 58% did not pass in July 2026. See where you stand across all of them.

Complete includes

✓An AI tutor on every question. The tutor already knows the correct answer
✓5 full timed mock papers, plus unlimited drilling — no daily cap
✓The whole 2,263-question bank, with worked answers and references, all 137 topics
✓Your weak-spot map: exactly where you’re losing marks

See what it costs →or try 25 questions free

One payment, nothing recurring. The 25-question diagnostic is free with no card.